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THE UNIFORM ENVIRONMENTAL 
COVENANTS ACT: WHY, HOW, AND 
WHETHER 
Kurt A. Strasser* 
Abstract: With contaminated land, it sometimes makes sense to do a par-
tial cleanup, rather than a complete one, and combine the cleanup with 
land use restrictions and continuing obligations to monitor the land. The 
Uniform Environmental Covenants Act creates a new state law property 
interest to make these restrictions and obligations permanent and en-
forceable. It addresses issues created by traditional common law doctrines 
that were hostile to permanent land restrictions, as well as more contem-
porary problems presented by tax liens, eminent domain, and adverse 
possession. This Article reviews the Act’s legal infrastructure for creating, 
enforcing, and modifying the terms of the land use restrictions and moni-
toring obligations. The Article argues that the Act’s legal infrastructure 
provides parties with the legal certainty needed to encourage future 
cleanups, while also protecting against environmental risks that the resid-
ual contamination could otherwise pose. These cleanups, often financed 
as part of the property’s redevelopment, are particularly useful because 
they are a way to return blighted properties to the stream of commerce. 
The Act has drawn some criticism, primarily for not going further with its 
protections, and these are reviewed at the end of the Article. 
Introduction 
 What is an environmental covenant? Why use it? Answers to these 
questions form the core of this Article. An environmental covenant is a 
specialized bit of legal infrastructure that has been created to solve 
some specific legal problems presented by environmental cleanups of 
contaminated property. Part I of this Article will discuss these problems. 
Part II will detail the solution offered by the Uniform Environmental 
Covenant Act (UECA), and Part III will review criticisms of the UECA. 
                                                                                                                      
* Interim Dean and Phillip I. Blumberg Professor, University of Connecticut Law 
School; Reporter, Uniform Environmental Covenants Act Drafting Committee. 
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I. The Problem 
 With environmental cleanups of real property, it is sometimes de-
sirable to stabilize some of the contamination and leave it in the 
ground. Yet that contamination could present some residual risk to 
human health or the environment if certain uses of the property are 
not restricted, or if the contamination is not monitored to be sure it is 
permanently stabilized. The Uniform Environmental Covenants Act1 
provides a legal tool to create and enforce property use restrictions and 
monitoring, or other requirements. But why leave any contamination in 
the ground at all? Cleanups that do so are called risk-based cleanups; is 
there any good reason for not cleaning up completely to avoid this risk 
altogether? In many regulatory situations, both state and federal regu-
lators have answered yes. Risk-based cleanups are one of the regularly 
used tools in the regulators’ kit.2 
 In some situations, the contamination may simply be beyond the 
capacity of current cleanup technology to clean it completely. The con-
taminants may be too hard to remove, separating the contaminants 
from the background material may not be possible, dispersal may be 
too wide, or accurately locating all the contamination may not be pos-
sible. Further, there are some situations in which cleaning up the 
known contaminant completely will cause other environmental harm 
that is, on balance, even worse. In these kinds of cases, regulators may 
reasonably decide that complete cleanup will not be required if other 
controls can protect the public and the environment. 
                                                                                                                      
1 Unif. Envtl. Covenants Act (2003), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ 
ulc/ueca/2003final.pdf. The Uniform Environmental Covenants Act (UECA) was drafted 
by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, and has been 
adopted by fourteen states as well as the Virgin Islands and the District of Columbia. See 
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, UECA State Activity Map, 
http://www.environmentalcovenants.org/ueca/UECAnews/UECA_colormap.pdf (last up-
dated Oct. 31, 2006). The UECA was introduced for adoption in nine additional states in 
2006, and these states anticipate reintroduction in 2007. Twelve other states also expect to 
introduce it in 2007. National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, 2006 
UECA Legislative Update, http://www.environmentalcovenants.org/ueca/uploads/UECA 
_Chart.pdf (last updated Aug. 18, 2006). Three states currently have study commissions 
and also contemplate introduction. Id. 
2 For critical scholarly discussion, see generally Kirsten H. Engel, Brownfield Initiatives 
and Environmental Justice: Second-Class Cleanups or Market-Based Equity, 13 J. Nat. Res. & 
Envtl. L. 317 (1998); Victor B. Flatt, “[H]e Should at His Peril Keep It There . . .”: How the 
Common Law Tells Us That Risk Based Corrective Action Is Wrong, 76 Notre Dame L. Rev. 341 
(2001); Alex Geisinger, Rethinking Risk-Based Environmental Cleanup, 76 Ind. L.J. 367 (2001); 
Larry Schnapf, Protecting Health and Safety with Institutional Controls, 14 Nat. Resources & 
Env’t 251 (2000). Specific criticisms of the UECA will be discussed infra Part III. 
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 Risk-based cleanups are also used when the cleanup is technically 
possible but not sensible. Suppose a contaminated property’s most 
likely use is for a factory, and that a partial cleanup will protect against 
residual risk presented by that use if there are appropriate use controls 
and monitoring requirements. Here, a regulator might quite reasona-
bly decide not to insist on the expense and delay of a complete cleanup 
when it is not required to protect the public and environment in the 
property’s contemplated use. Of course, such a regulatory decision is 
controversial because it is an overt acknowledgment that the complete 
cleanup, while possible, is not worth doing.3 This scenario is less than 
perfect environmental protection and some will simply disagree with 
the policy decision to do it. However, regulators might also consider 
two other practical factors in deciding to use a risk-based cleanup. 
 First, there are many contaminated properties.4 The U.S. Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency (EPA) estimates there are 450,000 brown-
fields in the United States.5 Complete cleanups are slow as well as ex-
pensive, and given the high number of properties, it will be a long time 
before all have been remediated. At this point, a second practical factor 
comes into consideration. Not only are resources for cleanups finite, 
but so are the enforcement resources needed to get them done. Most 
cleanups are done by private parties, or at least paid for by them, under 
some prospect of legal enforcement action.6 Enforcement resources are 
also needed to determine what type of cleanup is appropriate, as well as 
to supervise that cleanup. Regulators have only limited resources, and 
getting around to all the contaminated properties will be a time-
consuming process. In the meantime, these properties are likely to sit 
untouched, presenting some undetermined and unregulated level of 
environmental risks. 
 Further, to compound the problem, while the contaminated prop-
erties sit, they are not in productive use, providing jobs and economic 
support for their communities. The community impact of this loss of 
economic activity from the property can be severe, particularly so be-
cause many contaminated properties were formerly productive opera-
tions but their surrounding communities may now be blighted by the 
property’s combination of the loss of earning power and the presence 
                                                                                                                      
3 See Geisinger, supra note 2, at 370–71; infra Part III. 
4 See U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Brownfield Cleanup and Redevelopment, 
http://www.epa.gov/brownfields/about.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2007). 
5 Id. 
6 See Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 
U.S.C. § 9613(f) (2000). 
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of contamination.7 Of course, the properties are also not providing in-
come for their owners while sitting, but in many cases the owners may 
have simply decided that the property is no longer of real value to them 
and they may not be expecting a return, nor paying taxes on the prop-
erty. Indeed, during our work in drafting the UECA, the Drafting 
Committee was told more than once that the cheapest thing for an 
owner of a contaminated property is to pave it, put a fence around it, 
and hire a guard service to check on it. This solution does not return it 
to the local economy or support the local community. A less responsi-
ble owner might simply abandon the property and leave, adding to the 
environmental risk and not addressing the level of blight. 
 Regulators today are using risk-based cleanups, typically negotiat-
ing them with property owners or other liable parties.8 When risk-based 
cleanups are used, two kinds of restrictions are typically required. First, 
it is often necessary to restrict the use of the property.9 For example, a 
factory might be permitted, but a day care center or a public park pro-
hibited. Excavation below a depth of ten feet might be restricted, as 
might the use of well water. Second, a risk-based cleanup often requires 
that containment structures continue to be maintained and that the 
groundwater continue to be monitored.10 The difficulty is how to make 
both kinds of restrictions permanent, enforceable, and actually en-
forced in a property law system that is not generally hospitable to such 
long-term restrictions on real property. This is the problem that the 
UECA solves. 
II. The Solution: The Four Central Tasks of the Uniform 
Environmental Covenants Act 
 The Uniform Environmental Covenants Act (UECA) creates a 
state-law property interest that attaches use restrictions and monitoring 
                                                                                                                      
7 Professor Engel correctly points out that this issue may be a more complex question. 
See Engel, supra note 2, at 317–21. The current and previous industrial uses of brownfield 
properties may have exposed nearby residents to a higher degree of environmental risk, 
and those nearby residents are more likely to be members of minority and low-income 
groups. Id. at 317–18. A full environmental justice evaluation must consider the environ-
mental risks posed to the community by returning the property to the stream of com-
merce, as well as the economic gains to the community in doing so. See id. at 317–21. A 
perfectly functioning regulatory system will always control the risks of the new operation, 
but the real world system has had trouble with exactly this issue in environmental justice 
situations. See id. 
8 See Geisinger, supra note 2, at 368–69. 
9 Id. 
10 See id. at 371–72. 
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and other requirements to the land.11 At first blush, this task appears 
simple; wouldn’t a common law servitude do the trick? The short an-
swer is that it won’t do the job well enough. There are questions about 
the creation of this kind of servitude12 and its long term viability in the 
face of common law that is hostile to permanent land restrictions,13 as 
well as questions about how such a covenant can be modified,14 and 
about achieving a level of legal enforceability and real practical en-
forcement required to protect the public health and the environ-
ment.15 Further, with each of these areas, a great deal of certainty is 
needed so that commercial parties can make deals and redevelop 
properties, and lenders can supply financing, knowing their legal re-
sponsibilities and rights. Without this certainty, redevelopment and the 
cleanup it can realistically finance will be less likely to take place. Yet 
this certainty is difficult to achieve, and to predict, with the common 
law. The UECA aims to answer these questions, and to do so with 
enough clarity to provide the needed certainty. 
A. What Is Required to Create an Environmental Covenant? 
 The core requirement for the creation of an environmental cove-
nant is that it must state all the restrictions on the property, both the 
use restrictions and any monitoring and other obligations of the owner 
and others.16 These restrictions and requirements form the core of the 
covenant. Of course, this requirement would not mean much if the 
covenant were not discoverable by interested parties, and the UECA 
addresses this in two ways. First, it requires that the covenant be re-
corded in the land records of the state.17 This record gives legal notice 
of the covenant and makes it realistically available to all parties with the 
knowledge and skills to search the land records. In addition, an op-
                                                                                                                      
11 Unif. Envtl. Covenants Act, Prefatory Note (2003). 
12See id. § 5 cmt. 3; Kurt A. Strasser & William Breetz, The Benefit of a Uniform State Law 
for Institutional Controls, in Implementing Institutional Controls at Brownfields and 
Other Contaminated Sites 31, 31–33 (Amy L. Edwards, ed., 2003), available at http:// 
www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ueca/benefits02.pdf [hereinafter Implementing Institu-
tional Controls]. 
13 See Unif. Envtl. Covenants Act § 5 cmt. 3; Strasser & Breetz, supra note 12. 
14 See Unif. Envtl. Covenants Act § 5 cmt. 3; Strasser & Breetz, supra note 12. 
15 See Unif. Envtl. Covenants Act § 5 cmt. 3; Strasser & Breetz, supra note 12. 
16 UECA section 4(a)(3) requires the covenant to state the “activity and use” limita-
tions on the property. Unif. Envtl. Covenants Act § 4(a)(3). These are defined in sec-
tion 2(1) as the “restrictions or obligations created under this [Act] with respect to real 
property.” Id. § 2(1). 
17 Id. § 8(a). 
538 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 34:533 
tional section provides for creation of a registry of environmental cove-
nants,18 with a further option that the registry be electronically search-
able.19 In the age of the Internet, such a registry is certainly feasible 
and desirable. It would in fact make environmental covenants more 
realistically accessible to parties that may not have the resources or ex-
pertise needed to deal with the land records, including environmental 
and citizens’ groups as well as interested individuals and local govern-
ment officials. However, the registry was made optional in the UECA 
because some jurisdictions may not be willing to invest the resources 
needed to create and maintain it, and the other benefits of the UECA 
should still be available to them.20 
 The second core requirement for creating a covenant is that it 
must be agreed to by the agency supervising the cleanup, and by the 
property owner.21 The agency’s agreement is required to ensure that 
the covenant will in fact protect the public health and environment.22 
As drafted, the UECA allows either a state or a federal agency to ap-
prove a covenant if that agency is handling the underlying cleanup.23 
However, Kentucky and Delaware have made non-uniform changes to 
provide that only a state agency may approve covenants, presumably 
making the policy decision to retain this degree of control at the state 
                                                                                                                      
18 Id. § 12. 
19 Id. § 12(c)(7). 
20 See id. § 12. Eight of the adopting states to date have not included this optional pro-
vision: Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Nebraska, Nevada, Ohio, Utah and West Virginia. Kentucky 
omitted part of it, including the requirement of an electronically searchable registry. See 
2005 Ky. Acts ch. 92 (H.B. 472), available at http://lrc.ky.gov/Statrev/ACTS2005/0092.pdf. 
21 Unif. Envtl. Covenants Act § 4(a)(5). The covenant is also required to identify 
the administrative record for the cleanup project (“environmental response project”) and 
its location. Id. § 4(a)(6). This requirement will allow parties to learn more about the un-
derlying cleanup decision of which the covenant is a part. This section also allows the 
agency to waive a signature by the owner, although Delaware, Maine and South Dakota 
have removed or modified this provision. Id.; Del. Code Ann. tit. 7, § 7909(a)(5) (Supp. 
2006); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 38, § 3004(1)(E) (Supp. 2006); S.D. Codified Laws § 34A-
17-4 (Supp. 2006). Maine, for example, states that an environmental covenant must: 
Be signed by the agency, every holder and unless waived by the agency, every 
owner of the fee simple of the real property subject to the covenant, except 
that the agency may not waive signature by an owner of the fee simple who is 
the current occupant of the real estate, if any. 
Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 38, § 3004(1)(E). 
22 See Unif. Envtl. Covenants Act § 4, cmt. 2, 3. 
23 Id. § 2(2) (“‘Agency’ means the [. . . state regulatory agency for environmental pro-
tection] or any other state or federal agency that determines or approves the environ-
mental response project pursuant to which the environmental covenant is created.”) 
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level.24 As a result, in those states, federally supervised cleanups that 
use environmental covenants will have to seek state level approval for 
the covenant.25 This restriction raises the question of whether it will 
serve to complicate risk-based cleanup implementation—only experi-
ence can give us an accurate answer. It is true that the restriction in-
creases the state agency’s workload. 
 The third requirement for a covenant is that it identify a holder.26 
The concept of a holder is borrowed from the Uniform Conservation 
Easements Act.27 While the idea of identifying a party to hold the cove-
nant interest fits comfortably within traditional property law, its use 
here is more functional. A holder can be given supervisory responsibili-
ties for the enforcement of the covenant, and can even be given operat-
ing responsibilities for monitoring and maintenance.28 The UECA 
specifies that any person agreed to by the parties may be a holder.29 As 
experience with brownfield cleanups grows, some analysts predict that 
commercial entities may emerge that wish to specialize both in per-
forming cleanups and in the ongoing enforcement.30 In this situation, 
these groups would be holders under the UECA and their rights and 
responsibilities could be those specified in each particular covenant. 
However, the UECA preserves a great deal of flexibility by providing 
that the owner or the agency may serve as a holder—assuming other 
state law allows—and this provision should afford parties needed flexi-
bility to meet the requirements of the UECA without mandating a 
third-party holder if they do not wish to use one.31 Of course, local citi-
zens’ or environmental groups could serve as holders—if the parties 
agree to this—although these groups would want to consider carefully 
whether they were equipped to perform the responsibilities given them 
under a specific covenant. 
 The UECA also contains several formal requirements for a cove-
nant, including a requirement that it state that it is an environmental 
                                                                                                                      
24 See Del. Code Ann. tit. 7, §§ 7907(3), 7909(a)(5); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 224.80-
100(3), .80-110(2) (2006). 
25 Del. Code Ann. tit. 7, §§ 7907(3), 7909(a)(5); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 224.80-100(3), 
.80-110(2) (Supp. 2006). 
26 Unif. Envtl. Covenants Act § 4(a)(4). 
27 See Nat’l Conference of Comm’rs on Unif. State Laws, Uniform Conservation 
Easement Act 1 (Aug. 1981), available at http://www.cals.ncsu.edu/wq/lpn/PDFDocu- 
ments/uniform.pdf. 
28 Unif. Envtl. Covenants Act § 4 cmt. 7. 
29 Id. § 3(a). 
30 See Daniel A. Alper & Bruce-Sean Reshen, The GuardianTrust, in Implementing In-
stitutional Controls, supra note 12, at 39, 42–47. 
31 See Unif. Envtl. Covenants Act § 4 cmt. 5. 
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covenant under the UECA, and that it contain a legally sufficient de-
scription of the property.32 Beyond these, the UECA suggests a number 
of specific provisions that could be included in a covenant.33 This form 
of drafting was used to suggest elements that could well be important in 
specific instances but that, in the judgment of the drafting committee, 
would not necessarily be required in all covenants.34 For example, the 
covenant might have specific notice provisions prior to transfer of the 
property or a change in its use; it might require periodic reporting on 
compliance; it might give a narrative description of the contamination 
and the cleanup remedy; or it could contain specific limits on amend-
ment or termination beyond those specified in the UECA. In specific 
state variations, Iowa and Ohio have made the suggested statement of 
access rights mandatory, while Kentucky has dropped the suggestion.35 
 Taken together, these requirements for creating an environmental 
covenant are straightforward and should not present any particular 
problems. Their specificity should provide certainty that all parties will 
need. As will be discussed further in Part III, where these parts of the 
UECA have been criticized, it is not for what they require, but for not 
requiring more. After the covenant is created, the second task of the 
UECA is to make it valid and enforceable in the face of other existing 
law. 
B. Making the Covenant Valid and Enforceable 
 An environmental covenant exists in the context of much other 
real property law, and related law, that could threaten its validity or 
permanence. Specifically, the covenant must contend with a group of 
traditional common law rules that were hostile to long term or perma-
nent restrictions on real property, as well as with modern law on tax 
liens, eminent domain, and existing interests that predate the cove-
nant.36 The UECA seeks to remedy these problems so that environ-
mental covenants can be valid and permanent enough to protect the 
public health and environment.37 
 The common law has a number of doctrines that favor free aliena-
bility of property and disfavor long-term restrictions on land, and these 
                                                                                                                      
32 Id. § 4(a)(1), (2). 
33 Id. § 4(b)(1)–(6), cmt. 9–12. 
34 Id. § 4 cmt. 9–12. 
35 Iowa Code § 455I.4(1)(g) (Supp. 2006); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 224.80–.130 (2006); 
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 5301.82(A)(6) (Supp. 2006). 
36 Unif. Envtl. Covenants Act § 5 cmt. 3. 
37 Id. 
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doctrines would undercut covenants.38 The UECA responds in two 
ways. First, it provides that a covenant runs with the land and is in-
tended to be perpetual until terminated under the procedures and 
provisions of the UECA or by the covenant’s own terms.39 Second, the 
UECA specifies that a covenant is valid and enforceable even if it runs 
afoul of any of nine enumerated common law doctrines that might 
otherwise apply.40 For example, the covenant is not invalid even if: it is 
not appurtenant to an interest in real property; it is of a character not 
recognized traditionally at common law; it imposes a negative burden; 
or its benefit or burden does not touch and concern real property. 
Readers who do not find these common law rules of intrinsic interest 
may not recall them in precise detail, and indeed that is the point. 
Many of these are older doctrines and their contemporary application 
is often uncertain in specific jurisdictions. Further, whatever their con-
temporary policy merits in other circumstances, they should not invali-
date environmental covenants. Overruling these doctrines in clear 
terms removes any potential uncertainty they could present. This is also 
true of adverse possession, which is otherwise of more contemporary 
relevance; the UECA provides that it may not invalidate a covenant.41 
 In addition to the traditional common law doctrines that the 
UECA overrides, the UECA also provides that a covenant will not be 
limited or extinguished by a tax foreclosure sale.42 This reflects the pol-
icy decision that the environmental protection mission of the covenant 
must override the priority of a tax foreclosure and sale if the two come 
into conflict.43 This provision is needed because tax liens and foreclo-
sures are often present with contaminated properties.44 Contaminated 
properties are often ones that are underperforming economically— 
indeed, they may be of little or no value as current income producers. 
Many properties in this situation will be delinquent in their taxes.45 For 
the covenant to provide real protection—as well as real assurance to 
commercial parties performing the cleanup and re-using the prop-
erty—it must not be vulnerable to a tax sale. Without this protection, 
                                                                                                                      
38 Id. 
39 Id. §§ 5(a), 9(a). 
40 Id. § 5(b). 
41 Id. § 9(c). 
42 Unif. Envtl. Covenants Act § 9(c). 
43 Id. § 9 cmt. 4. 
44 See Carrie Watkins, Not My Brownfield: Municipal Liability for Acquiring Title to Brown-
fields at the Federal and New York State Level, 9 Alb. L. Envtl. Outlook J. 275, 277 (2004). 
45 Of course, these properties may also command a poor price in a tax foreclosure 
sale. 
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the commercial realities of contaminated properties would make many 
covenants uncertain and unable to protect against environmental risk. 
 Beyond common law doctrines and tax liens, the UECA also deals 
with the question of existing mortgages and other prior interests in the 
real property.46 Its basic provision is that the covenant does not override 
these interests, so the holders of mortgages and other interests must 
agree to subordinate them if they are to be subject to the covenant.47 
This strategy is consistent with the traditional property law rule that 
interests which are first in time are also first in right.48 While this factor 
makes the UECA’s provisions compatible with widely accepted property 
law policies and doctrines, it does raise a question of whether the cove-
nant and its obligations will be enforceable as long as needed to protect 
against environmental risk. The UECA’s response to this question is to 
encourage subordination of the prior interests, including mortgages, to 
the covenant.49 
 Subordination of interests in real estate to rearrange the priorities 
is common in many property transactions. In the specific situation in-
volving contaminated property, the realities of contamination’s effect 
on property values should often motivate a mortgage holder to agree to 
the subordination. Contaminated property that has no cleanup pros-
pect enjoys greatly reduced market value, or even little or no value, and 
the mortgage on that property is practically devalued as well. If a risk-
based cleanup and subsequent re-use of the property can be accom-
plished, the property value will likely increase, thereby increasing the 
real value of the mortgage as well. In this situation, one can well imag-
ine that the mortgage holder would agree to subordinate the mortgage 
to the environmental covenant in order to get the cleanup done, the 
property re-used, and the value increased. Further, the UECA gives the 
agency power to disapprove any proposed covenant, and this disap-
proval could be based on a failure to secure subordination of existing 
mortgages or other prior interests.50 In this way the agency can insure 
that the covenant is not vulnerable to an existing mortgage.51 Yet one 
critical point must be emphasized here. The agency can only insist on 
                                                                                                                      
46 See Unif. Envtl. Covenants Act § 3(d). 
47 Id. The UECA does specify that an agreement to subordinate does not create any 
other obligation on the subordinating party. Id. § 3(d)(4). This requirement should pro-
vide reassurance to subordinating parties that they are not thereby otherwise committing 
themselves to perform the covenant. 
48 Restatement (Third) of Property: Mortgages § 7.1 (1997). 
49 See Unif. Envtl. Covenants Act § 3(d). 
50 Id. §§ 3 cmt., 4(a)(5). 
51 See id. 
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subordination of interests that it knows about, and it will only know 
about interests if it bothers to ask.52 As a practical matter, the agency 
can require the owner to check for prior interests and secure subordi-
nations.53 But it must remember to do so. 
 The UECA also has special provisions for two other legal risks to 
the covenant: eminent domain and judicial modification of the cove-
nant because of changed circumstances.54 Under the UECA, an envi-
ronmental covenant can be modified or terminated in an eminent do-
main proceeding only if two special requirements are met.55 First, the 
agency must be a party to the proceedings.56 Second, the court in the 
eminent domain proceeding must hold a hearing and determine that 
the termination or modification “will not adversely affect human health 
or the environment.”57 Agency approval is required before a court can 
terminate or modify a covenant under the doctrine of changed circum-
stances, effectively giving it the power to stop such a change in the 
covenant.58 The policy behind each of these provisions is to limit a 
court’s power to change a covenant without hearing from the agency 
because a generalist common law court may not properly appreciate 
the covenant’s importance in protecting public health and the envi-
ronment without the agency’s guidance.59 Of course, the protections 
require a different level of agency involvement. Agency approval is re-
quired for application of the doctrine of changed circumstances, while 
only agency participation in the proceeding is required in eminent 
                                                                                                                      
52 See id. § 3 cmt. The comment to section 3 states: 
Thus, in preparing an environmental covenant, it might be advisable for the 
agency to identify all prior interests, determine which interests may interfere 
with the covenant protecting human health and the environment, and then 
take steps to avoid the possibility of such interference. The agency may do 
this by, for example, having the parties obtain appropriate subordination of 
prior interests, as a condition to the agency’s approval of the environmental 
covenant. 
Id. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. § 9(a)(5). 
55 Unif. Envtl. Covenants Act § 9(a)(5). 
56 Id. 
57 Id. § 9(a)(5)(C). The UECA also requires that notice be given to all parties who 
would have to consent to a voluntary modification or termination, as well as all parties who 
have an interest in the property. Id. §§ 9(a)(5)(B), 10(a)–(b). 
58 Id. § 9(b). In addition, the same parties are required to be given notice of the pro-
ceeding. Id. 
59 Id. § 9 cmt. 2. 
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domain.60 This difference was based on the drafting committee’s con-
clusion that eminent domain is a process that includes the participation 
of other public actors, specifically the party seeking to take the prop-
erty, each of which has its own public mission.61 There may be situa-
tions in which those actors and missions could present a compelling 
case for changing the covenant even if the agency was not satisfied that 
its environmental risk protection mission was accomplished. Some of 
the approving states have enacted modifications to these provisions.62 
C. Modifying or Terminating the Covenant 
 The specific use restrictions and monitoring obligations in any 
particular covenant are site and use specific; they are the restrictions 
determined to be necessary to protect the public and the environment 
from the risks posed by this contamination at this site.63 Over time, 
these risks can change, either because the use of the property changes, 
the nature of the contamination changes, or the science on which our 
understanding of the risk is based changes. For example, it may be that 
the covenant’s terms were sufficient to protect against the risks posed 
by the particular residual contaminant if the property is used for indus-
trial manufacturing. If that use changes to residential condominiums, 
then the ways in which people using the property may be exposed to 
the contamination also change, and it will not be surprising if the risk 
posed by the contamination does, as well. In this situation, it is quite 
likely that the property will require more cleanup before the use 
change can be allowed, and the agency will insist on this cleanup as a 
condition of agreeing to the change in the covenant.64 For this reason, 
the UECA specifies requirements for amending or terminating a cove-
nant.65 
 However, as a preliminary point, it should be noted that amending 
the covenant is not the only way to change the real regulatory require-
                                                                                                                      
60 Id. § 9(a)(5)(A), (b). 
61 See Unif. Envtl. Covenants Act § 9 cmt. 2. 
62 See Del. Code Ann. tit. 7 § 7914(a), (c) (Supp. 2006); Iowa Code § 455I.9(2) 
(Supp. 2006). Delaware and Iowa give the agency, rather than the court, the power to 
make the initial decision on application of the doctrine of changed circumstances, al-
though Iowa specifies a right to judicial review. Del. Code Ann. tit. 7 § 7914(a), (c); Iowa 
Code § 455I.9(2). 
63 Unif. Envtl. Covenants Act § 2 cmt. 1. 
64 An amendment might also be needed if the actual contamination is more or less 
significant than originally thought, or if scientific advancements show that the risks posed 
by a predicted exposure level are greater or less than originally thought. 
65 See Unif. Envtl. Covenants Act § 10(a). 
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ments on the property and those liable for it. There is, of course, a 
quite substantial body of both state and federal law regulating cleanup 
of contaminated property, and that law has requirements that extend 
beyond the covenant. Specifically, when the covenant is part of a regu-
latory determination of the extent and scope of cleanup required, that 
regulatory law continues to apply to the property outside the cove-
nant.66 That law typically provides that the regulatory agency approving 
the cleanup has the power to re-open the remedy determined if protec-
tion of the public health of the environment so requires.67 The UECA 
does not strip that power from state environmental regulatory agencies 
and, of course, could not do so with respect to federal agencies.68 While 
such regulatory re-openings of a concluded cleanup determination are 
in fact rare,69 they are possible where protection from environmental 
risk requires them. 
 Under the UECA, the covenant can be amended or terminated 
with the consent of specified parties and it will be helpful to review the 
motives and interests of those parties in the process or working out a 
change.70 First, agreement of the regulatory agency is required in order 
to insure that the changed covenant, or the termination, continues to 
provide protection from the environmental risk posed by the contami-
nants.71 In addition, the change must be agreed to by the current 
owner of the fee simple interest in the property.72 This is not surprising 
for, as discussed above, this party is bound by the terms of the cove-
nant.73 Where a change of use is contemplated, this party is presumably 
either the one making the change, or selling to the party who wishes to 
                                                                                                                      
66 Id. § 10 cmt. 7. 
67 See Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 
U.S.C. § 9604 (2000); Unif. Envtl. Covenants Act § 10 cmt. 7. 
68 See Unif. Envtl. Covenants Act § 11(b). 
69 Daniel P. Selmi and Kenneth A. Manaster discuss the various mechanisms states use 
to assure parties that reopeners will not be used often. 1 Daniel P. Selmi & Kenneth A. 
Manaster, State Environmental Law § 9:57 (2006); see Matthew Bender, Environ-
mental Law Practice Guide: State and Federal Law § 32.10[2] (2006). 
70 See Unif. Envtl. Covenants Act § 10(a). 
71 See id. § 10(a)(1). Comment 7 of section 10 notes that the agency may wish to re-
quire notice to a much larger group of potentially interested parties, and also provides 
some specific matters the notice might be required to contain, as a condition of its ap-
proval of the settlement. Id. § 10 cmt. 7. 
72 Id. § 10(a)(2). 
73 See id. § 4. The UECA does give the agency the power to waive this agreement, which 
might be necessary if the property has been abandoned and the owner of the fee can no 
longer be located. See id. § 10(a)(2). Delaware and South Dakota have removed this waiver 
power. Del. Code Ann. tit. 7, § 7915(a)(2) (Supp. 2006); S.D. Codified Laws § 34A-17-
10(a)(2) (Supp. 2006). 
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make the change. In addition, the UECA requires that the change be 
agreed to by the holder.74 
 The third party, or parties, who must consent are all those who 
originally signed the covenant, unless they either waived this right in the 
original covenant, or a court determines they can no longer be located 
or identified in “the exercise of reasonable diligence.”75 Two kinds of 
parties are the most likely to be present in this group. First are local citi-
zens’ groups, environmental groups, or local governments which were 
signatories to the original agreement because they had a strong interest 
in the cleanup and the agency insisted that they be party to the cove-
nant.76 If their interest was so recognized in the covenant, then the in-
terest is presumably still strong and they should be part of the decision 
to change the covenant. 
 The second group are non-owner parties who were part of the 
original covenant because they were liable for the cleanup under back-
ground federal or state law.77 The cleanup liability of these parties for 
the property typically continues under Superfund and analogous state 
law even after the cleanup has been determined and the covenant im-
plemented.78 In addition, they are potentially at risk for common law 
liability if personal or property injury results from exposure to the con-
tamination. While one may question whether this continuing liability 
exposure after a regulated cleanup is good policy, there appears to be 
limited political movement to change existing law. Because these par-
ties have a continuing risk of liability, they will only agree to settle-
ments, including those with covenants, in which they feel they have 
enough control over future use of the property to protect against their 
liability exposure. These parties will insist on having a say in amend-
ments and terminations of the covenant, or they will not agree to the 
covenant—and the rest of the cleanup settlement—in the first place. By 
requiring their consent to the amendment or termination, the UECA 
                                                                                                                      
74 Unif. Envtl. Covenants Act § 10(a)(4). 
75 Id. § 10(a)(3). Iowa has given the waiver power to the agency, rather than a court, 
and Utah gives the power to either the court or the agency. Iowa Code § 4551.10(1)(C) 
(Supp. 2006); Utah Code Ann. § 57-25-110(1)(c) (Supp. 2006). 
76 Unif. Envtl. Covenants Act § 10(a)(4). 
77 This group includes Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and 
Liability Act (CERCLA) parties. 
78 Federal regulators and some state regulators have the power to limit the end of such 
liability, but the realities of the regulatory process are that this rarely happens. See generally 
Bender, supra note 69; Selmi & Manaster, supra note 69. These could be, for example, 
parties whose liability is based on use of the property during the period when some of the 
contamination occurred. 
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gives them a means to protect this interest and thus seeks to encourage 
them to agree to the cleanup and the covenant in the first place. 
 What of the owners of other interests in the property, such as a 
mortgage holder or tenant? The UECA does not require that these par-
ties agree to the amendment, but it does specify that their interest is 
not affected by the amendment unless they agree to the change, or 
waive the right to agree in the original covenant.79 Why might a mort-
gage holder, for example, agree to this? The optimistic scenario is that 
the property is being changed to a more highly valued use, so the mort-
gage interest is more valuable or at least more secure. The factory is 
converted to residential condos, for example, because condos in this 
location are something that the relevant property users value more 
highly. In this happy situation, the mortgage is even more secure. But 
suppose we have a less optimistic scenario, in which the use restrictions 
are being tightened in response to a greater risk from the contamina-
tion than was originally thought. Here the mortgage holder has no ob-
vious motivation to agree to the change because it is likely restricting 
the property, or requiring further cleanup, that is making the property 
less valuable in fact. However, this is not changing the nature of the 
mortgage holder’s interest and thus should not be seen as “affecting” 
it.80 Finally, many of these interests can be ones that are not much im-
pacted by the covenant at all, such as utility rights of way, for example. 
 The UECA seeks to provide a reasonable and workable method for 
changing covenants, but one which also protects the important inter-
ests of all parties. Finding the best balance between these objectives is 
difficult. The UECA’s requirements do a good job of protecting those 
interests, and thus encouraging formation of the covenants in the first 
place. However, providing that protection comes at some cost, for the 
UECA’s requirements for changing or terminating a covenant are de-
manding and such changes will not be easily made. 
D. Enforcing the Covenant 
 The UECA provides for enforcement of a covenant by a civil action 
for injunctive or other equitable relief and authorizes a number of par-
ties to bring an enforcement action.81 It authorizes an enforcement ac-
                                                                                                                      
79 Unif. Envtl. Covenants Act § 10(b). 
80 See id. 
81 Id. § 11(a). 
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tion by the agency that approved the covenant and also by the state 
regulatory agency if it was not the approving agency.82 
 The UECA gives all parties to the covenant the right to bring an 
enforcement action, partially overlapping with this provision.83 This 
right will include the owner of the property at the time the covenant 
was created, as well as the holder if this is a different party, but it will 
also reach others. For instance, a party who was responsible for the 
cleanup costs, even if it was not the owner, would likely have been a 
party to the covenant. This could be, for example, an industrial com-
pany that leased and operated the property at the time the contamina-
tion was disposed of or one which used the property solely for waste 
disposal. As discussed above, such a potentially responsible party (PRP) 
has a strong interest in ensuring that the covenant is enforced because 
the regulatory liability for the cleanup often continues after the 
cleanup, and it may have potential toxic tort liability as well.84 En-
forcement power for this party will be crucial to getting it to enter the 
covenant in the first place. In addition, citizens’ groups or environ-
mental groups may have been parties to the covenant, and if they were, 
they will have enforcement power to protect their interest in seeing that 
the covenant is obeyed and the community thus protected.85 These 
groups are well located to learn of violations and likely to be motivated 
to address them. The UECA provides that the covenant itself can grant 
enforcement authority to any specific party, and these groups might 
also be covered here even if they are not parties to the covenant.86 The 
UECA extends enforcement authority more broadly to include the lo-
cal municipal government where the property is located.87 The local 
government’s interest in enforcing the covenant to protect its citizens is 
obvious, and it is also well positioned to learn of violations and be moti-
vated to protect them. 
 Finally, the UECA reaches out to authorize covenant enforcement 
by people whose interest is in the property rather than in the covenant 
                                                                                                                      
82 Id. § 11(a)(2). The District of Columbia gives the Attorney General, not the agency, 
the power to bring a civil action. D.C. Code Ann. § 8-671.10(a)(2) (2006). 
83 Unif. Envtl. Covenants Act § 11(a)(1). 
84 See supra text accompanying notes 44–47. 
85 See Unif. Envtl. Covenants Act § 11(a)(1). 
86 Id. § 11(a)(3). The UECA does specify that simply being given enforcement power 
in the covenant will not give rise to liability for the cleanup. Id. § 11(c). Cleanup liability 
under both state and federal law has proven to be so expansive that parties are under-
standably nervous to avoid any activity that might generate liability. 
87 Id. § 11(a)(5). 
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as such.88 Thus, the covenant can be enforced by anyone whose interest 
in the property or whose collateral or liability “may be affected by the 
alleged violation of the covenant.”89 This is potentially a broad group, 
and also one that may not be easily defined short of litigation. Authoriz-
ing enforcement power will enable parties with these interests in the 
property or related legal involvement to be able to protect their inter-
ests through enforcing the covenant, and is comprehensible policy at 
this level. It does introduce some potential uncertainty into some en-
forcement actions. However, the uncertainty, while real, should prove 
manageable because it will only be at the margin in determining the 
group of parties who can sue. 
 The specific provisions of the UECA do not determine all en-
forcement actions. As discussed above, covenants are entered into as 
part of a larger resolution of an environmental cleanup that is, typically, 
done under broader regulatory mandates and authorizations.90 Those 
regulatory regimes include their own enforcement provisions and those 
provisions will also apply to the covenant. Thus, for example, in a cove-
nant approved by EPA, the Agency would have the authority to enforce 
the covenant under federal regulatory law rather than under the 
UECA.91 This would also be true for state regulators acting under a state 
regulatory system.92 However, the UECA does not provide for citizen 
suits generally, and, as will be discussed below, has received substantial 
criticism for this.93 
III. Criticism of the Uniform Environmental Covenants Act 
 Several substantial criticisms have been made of specific portions 
of the Uniform Environmental Covenants Act (UECA).94 These criti-
                                                                                                                      
88 Id. § 11(a)(4). 
89 Id. 
90 See supra text accompanying notes 66–68. 
91 See Unif. Envtl. Covenants Act, Prefatory Note. 
92 Id. § 11(b). The UECA specifically provides that it does not limit the state regula-
tor’s authority in this regard. Id. 
93 A covenant entered into pursuant to a cleanup undertaken under federal law, such 
as CERCLA, could be enforced under that law, including its citizen suit provisions. 42 
U.S.C. § 9659 (2004). However, this action would be a citizen suit under CERCLA, for ex-
ample, not under the UECA. See id. This issue is discussed further, infra Part III. 
94 See Ass’n of State and Territorial Solid Waste Mgmt. Officials (ASTSWMO), 
Information Paper on the Uniform Environmental Covenants Act (UECA) (April 
19, 2006), available at http://www.astswmo.org (follow “Publications” hyperlink; then fol-
low “Federal Facilities Research Center” hyperlink; then follow “Uniform Environmental 
Covenants Act (UECA) (April 2006)” hyperlink) [hereinafter ASTSWMO]; Paul Stanton 
Kibel, A Shallow Fix: The Uniform Environmental Covenants Act Leaves Hard Brownfield Ques-
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cisms generally accept the basic proposition that legal infrastructure is 
needed for environmental covenants, and appear to agree with much 
of the infrastructure the UECA offers.95 The criticisms fall into three 
groups. First, the UECA is criticized for not requiring more in creating 
environmental covenants, specifically for not providing sufficient pub-
lic participation in their creation and enforcement.96 The second criti-
cism is that the UECA interferes with local zoning in inappropriate 
ways.97 Third is the claim that the UECA’s reliance on a state law prop-
erty interest, rather than a state law police power, as the basis for the 
covenant’s restrictions leads to a number of bad policy choices.98 
A. Creating and Enforcing the Covenant 
 The first group of criticisms focuses on the creation of environ-
mental covenants, and to a lesser extent on the lack of citizen suits for 
enforcement. The UECA does not give any criteria for when an envi-
ronmental covenant should be used, nor does it have an explicit regu-
latory “trigger” requiring one in specified circumstances.99 The claim 
here is that without such standards or such a trigger, environmental 
covenants may be used when they shouldn’t, or not used when they 
should.100 A related criticism is that the UECA does not mandate a spe-
cific process of public involvement in the decision to use a covenant, or 
                                                                                                                      
tions Unanswered, 57 Planning & Envtl. L. 3, 4 (Feb. 2005); Andrea Ruiz-Esquide, Com-
ment, The Uniform Environmental Covenants Act—An Environmental Justice Perspective, 31 
Ecology L.Q. 1007, 1036–49 (2004); Andrea Ruiz-Esquide, Directions to Solutions: Why 
UECA Is Incomplete—A Reply to Professors Breetz and Strasser 2–4 (2005), http://lucs.org/ 
news.cfm?id=279 [hereinafter Ruiz-Esquide Reply]; Dan Miller, Colo. Dep’t of Law, Pres-
entation at ASTSWMO Annual Meeting: The Uniform Environmental Covenant Act: Is-
sues for States (Oct. 27, 2005). Professor Miller gave a similar Powerpoint presentation at 
the EPA’s Institutional Controls Roundtable and Training on April 4–6, 2006. That presen-
tation is available at http://www.epa.gov/superfund/action/ic/pdfs/miller_ueca.pdf. 
95 See Kibel, supra note 94, at 6 (“When judged by the limited parameters and goals 
adopted as part of the UECA drafting process, the NCCUSL was by and large successful. 
The UECA includes many provisions that do in fact help reconcile the use of environ-
mental covenants . . . .”). 
96 See Kibel, supra note 94, at 7; Miller, supra note 94. 
97 See Kibel, supra note 94, at 4–5; Miller, supra note 94. 
98 See Kibel, supra note 94 at 6–8 (criticizing the UECA’s drafting process). The basic 
claim is that, because the U.S. Department of Defense supplied part of the funding for the 
UECA’s preparation, the UECA is skewed in its emphasis and results. Id. The claim is ad-
dressed by Professors Strasser and Breetz and will not be further considered here. See Kurt 
A. Strasser & William Breetz, Why the Uniform Environmental Covenants Act Makes Sense: A 
Reply to Paul Kibel, 57 Planning & Envtl. L. 7, 9 (2006). 
99 See Kibel, supra note 94, at 4; Miller, supra note 94. 
100 See Kibel, supra note 94, at 4; Miller, supra note 94. 
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the decisions about specific provisions to include.101 Such public in-
volvement should be part of the process of establishing an environ-
mental covenant and, it is claimed, should be mandated in the UECA. 
 While this description of the UECA is accurate, the criticism mis-
understands the UECA’s role in a larger legal/regulatory tableau. 
These criticisms are unfortunate because they ignore the regulatory 
context in which environmental covenants are used and risk-based 
remedies are determined. Environmental covenants are used to im-
plement the land use restrictions and ongoing maintenance require-
ments of risk-based cleanups.102 As such, they are implemented only at 
the end of the decision-making process which determines all aspects of 
the remedy. Good decisions are essential in that process if the public is 
to be protected from environmental risks that the contamination of-
fers. But the decision to use a risk-based cleanup together with an envi-
ronmental covenant—rather than imposing a cleanup to background, 
residential or unrestricted use—is part of a larger determination of the 
remedy.103 It does not make sense to require standards or processes 
only for use of environmental covenants. Any effective standards or 
processes must apply throughout the entire remedy determining pro-
cedure. The remedy specification process already has both standards 
and processes. 
 There is a large body of federal and state law that articulates the 
standards for environmental cleanups, as well as the notice and consul-
tation requirements in the process.104 Federal cleanup standards are 
extensive and detailed.105 Similarly, federal procedures require exten-
sive notice and opportunity to comment in the remedy selection proc-
ess.106 Many states have similar laws. For example, in California, there 
are extensive environmental statutes and regulations governing both 
the substantive cleanup decision, as well as the notice and comment 
process for making it.107 While California’s are perhaps more detailed 
                                                                                                                      
101 Kibel, supra note 94, at 7; Ruiz-Esquide Reply, supra note 94, at 2–3. The Association 
of State and Territorial Solid Waste Management Officials (ASTSWMO) makes the related 
criticism that private cleanups not done under regulatory statutes will not have public 
involvement unless the agency approving them requires otherwise. See ASTSWMO, supra 
note 94. Of course, private cleanups that do not gain regulatory approval will not give rise 
to environmental covenants that enjoy the provisions of the UECA, as agency approval is a 
condition of the UECA’s coverage. See Unif. Envtl. Covenants Act § 4(a)(5) (2003). 
102 See Unif. Envtl. Covenants Act § 2. 
103 See id. at Prefatory Note. 
104 See id. 
105 See CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9621 (2004). 
106 See id. § 9617. 
107 See, e.g., Cal. Health & Safety Code §§ 25356, 25356.1, 25358.7 (2000). 
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than many, such provisions are typical of state cleanup laws.108 The 
leading multi-state study concludes: 
Forty-six (46) states provide public notice at state cleanup 
sites—29 based on statute or regulation, and 17 by policy or 
on an ad hoc basis . . . . Forty-five (45) states receive public 
comment at state cleanup sites—31 based on statute or regu-
lation, and 14 by policy or on an ad hoc basis . . . . Forty-three 
(43) states hold hearings or meetings at state cleanup sites— 
26 based on statute or regulation, and 17 based on policy or 
on an ad hoc basis.109 
 Specific standards for covenants and specific procedural require-
ments for their adoption would be seriously incomplete if they did not 
address other aspects of the remedy. There are standards for remedies, 
both procedural and substantive. If these standards are inadequate, 
then they should be revised and improved for the whole remedy proc-
ess, not just for this piece of it. To this point, none of the critics have 
argued that the existing requirements are inadequate or even consid-
ered these requirements. 
 Commentators criticized the UECA for not providing greater pub-
lic involvement in the form of citizen suits.110 An earlier draft of the 
UECA did provide such a remedy.111 The argument for them here is 
substantial. Local citizens’ groups, including environmental groups, are 
quite concerned that use restrictions and other requirements of an en-
vironmental covenant be enforced, and these groups are likely to be 
well positioned to observe activity on the property and respond with an 
enforcement action. This fact was much of the reason that the UECA 
Drafting Committee originally considered them. Citizen suits are a very 
common feature of federal environmental law.112 However, their use by 
states is much more mixed; fifteen states have some form of citizen 
                                                                                                                      
108 See Envtl. L. Inst., Analysis of State Superfund Programs: 50-State Study, 
2001 Update 100, 102 (2002). 
109Id. at 100. Many states have enacted statutes on cleanup policies and criteria, as well 
as public participation requirements. See Conn. Gen. Stat. § 22a-133k (2006); Me. Rev. 
Stat. Ann. tit. 38, § 343-E (Supp. 2006); Md. Code Ann., Envir. §§ 7-509, 7-510 (Supp. 
2006); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 58:10B-12 (2006); 35 Pa. Stat. Ann. §§ 6020.504, 6020.1115 
(2003); R.I. Gen. Laws § 23-19.1-6 (2001); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 10, §§ 6615a, 6615b (2006); 
W. Va. Code § 22-22-4 (2002). 
110 See Ruiz-Esquide Reply, supra note 94, at 4–6. 
111 Id. at 4. 
112 See 2 Daniel P. Selmi & Kenneth A. Manaster, State Environmental Law 
§ 16:52 (2006); Ruiz-Esquide Reply, supra note 94, at 5. 
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suits, although the details are widely varied.113 In the end, the Drafting 
Committee was more persuaded by this lack of uniformity on the state 
level. With state practice here so non-uniform, this UECA did not ap-
pear to be the proper vehicle to address the question of citizen suits 
under state law. This is a difficult policy decision and there is room for 
reasonable people to disagree. Some states have authorized citizen suits 
for environmental law broadly—in these states there will also be citizen 
suits to enforce environmental covenants.114 The Drafting Committee 
ultimately determined that this matter should be resolved on a state-by-
state basis with reference to broader state policy than that for environ-
mental covenants.115 
B. Interference with Local Zoning 
 While the UECA is clear that it does not authorize a use of real 
property that is otherwise prohibited by zoning,116 an environmental 
covenant could impose restrictions that prohibit a use allowed by zon-
ing. The question is whether this is an improper interference with local 
zoning.117 The use restrictions validated by the UECA are entirely con-
sistent with other kinds of use restrictions often included in privately 
recorded covenants that have nothing to do with contamination, and 
these restrictions often have the identical effect of denying future own-
ers the right to develop the property for uses permitted by zoning but 
inconsistent with the agreement of that buyer and seller.118 
 The interrelationship of zoning ordinances and restrictive cove-
nants is dealt with extensively in the legal literature and poses no special 
legal challenge. Consider, for example, this conclusion from Anderson’s 
American Law of Zoning: 
The existence of restrictive covenants does not reduce the 
power of local legislative bodies to impose zoning regulations 
                                                                                                                      
113 See generally Selmi & Manaster, supra note 112; Nat’l Conference of Comm’rs 
on Unif. State Laws, Draft Unif. Envtl. Covenants Act § 10 (Feb. 28, 2003), available 
at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ueca/feb2003comparedraft.pdf [hereinafter Draft 
UECA]. 
114 See Selmi & Manaster, supra note 69, at § 9.32–.37. 
115 See Draft UECA, supra note 113, § 10. 
116 Unif. Envtl. Covenants Act § 6 (2003). 
117 Kibel, supra note 94, at 4–5, 7 (arguing that the use of environmental covenants to 
impose restrictions that prohibit a use allowed by zoning is an improper interference with 
local zoning). 
118 See Unif. Envtl. Covenants Act § 6 cmt. 
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on lands subject to such covenants, nor does the adoption of 
such ordinance destroy the effectiveness of such covenants.119 
The general law of zoning is that the more restrictive provision govern-
ing the parcel applies. 
 If regulators and the owners agree on a risk-based cleanup remedy, 
land use restrictions will presumably be needed to protect the public 
and the environment. The uses to be prohibited are presumably ones 
that must be restricted for the health of the community or protection 
of the environment, and the fact that local zoning might otherwise au-
thorize a “higher and better” use that presents a greater health risk 
does not make it wise public policy.120 In addition, such a specific, cove-
nanted restriction is not generally considered to be inconsistent with 
general zoning restrictions.121 
C. Property Law or Police Power? 
 The UECA implements a basic policy choice to use state property 
law to create durable and enforceable restrictions, and this choice leads 
to a number of specific provisions and related policy choices that have 
been critically noted.122 The alternative approach would base environ-
mental covenant restrictions and requirements on state police power, 
rather than on property law. Under such an approach, its supporters 
claim, state regulators would have more control over the covenants and 
                                                                                                                      
119 1 Patricia E. Stalkin, Anderson’s American Law of Zoning § 3:4, at 88 (4th ed. 
1995). Another treatise concurs: 
Property may be subject to private restrictions and zoning controls that differ 
in the uses they allow. For example, a prior covenant may restrict property to 
a residential use while a subsequent zoning ordinance allows a business use. 
In that event, courts universally hold that the ordinance does not abrogate 
the restrictive covenant. A would-be violator of a covenant cannot seek refuge 
behind the permission of zoning authorities. 
Julian Conrad Juergensmeyer & Thomas L. Roberts, Land Use Planning and Devel-
opment Regulation Law § 15.14, at 775 (2003). 
120 See Strasser & Breetz, supra note 98, at 7–9 (providing further discussion of this is-
sue). 
121 Id. at 8–9. 
122 See ASTSWMO, supra note 94, at 1–4; Miller, supra note 94. Mr. Miller is the Assis-
tant Attorney General for Environmental Matters in Colorado and was a primary drafter of 
the Colorado statute which bases its environmental covenants on the police power. He 
served ably and effectively as an advisor to UECA. ASTSWMO is a primary national organi-
zation of state environmental regulatory officials. 
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this would lead to important differences in formation, modification, 
and enforcement of the covenants.123 
 Using a police power approach is consistent with requiring the ap-
proval of state regulators to create a covenant, regardless of whether 
the state regulator was in charge of the underlying cleanup opera-
tion.124 This use will certainly give state regulators more control over all 
covenants, as federal regulators will have to obtain state consent before 
creating a covenant on federally supervised projects. While the ration-
ale is not fully explained, supporters of this approach note that federal 
regulators may resist state property law interests.125 To the extent that 
state and federal regulators disagree on the appropriate level of re-
quired cleanup and the necessary restrictions to protect against the 
risks posed by residual contamination, state views on these questions 
would prevail in the covenant. However, as the covenant is part of a lar-
ger remedy determination, this change alone will not insure that state 
views will be respected in the rest of a determination where a federal 
agency is supervising a cleanup under federal law.126 Presumably, this 
requirement will necessitate the use of state supervisory resources on 
federal cleanups, potentially slowing down approvals or redirecting 
those resources from other state efforts. Beyond this necessity, a final 
evaluation of the merits of this requirement depends on one’s view of 
the merits of the respective opinions of state and federal regulators 
when they differ. 
 When a covenant is adopted as an exercise of state police power, it 
is argued, modification with only the approval of the state agency is jus-
tified and appropriate.127 Such a modification is easier to accomplish 
than one under the UECA because the consent of other parties is not 
required.128 The difference comes in a situation in which the agency 
wishes to make a modification when some or all of the other parties do 
not. Under the UECA, the agency’s consent is required for a modifica-
tion, so there is no question of approving modifications the agency op-
poses.129 Yet requiring the consent of the parties in order to modify a 
                                                                                                                      
123 See ASTSWMO, supra note 94, at 2–3; Miller, supra note 94. 
124 This requirement has been added by two jurisdictions which have adopted the 
UECA. See supra notes 24–25 and accompanying text. 
125 See ASTSWMO, supra note 94, at 2–3; Miller, supra note 94. 
126 State views have some status in federal cleanups, but this extent varies with different 
regulatory regimes and situations. 
127 See ASTSWMO, supra note 94, at 2–4; Miller, supra note 94. 
128 See Unif. Envtl. Covenants Act § 10 (2003). 
129 See id. § 10(a)(1). However, under the UECA the approving agency might be a fed-
eral agency if it supervised the remedy, rather than the state agency. Id. § 2(2). This fact is 
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covenant, the argument runs, gives those parties an effective “veto” 
over modifications which they might exercise for reasons unrelated to 
the merits of the modification. This effect is described as creating in 
the parties a “property right in pollution,” although the nature and ex-
tent of the property right are not explored.130 As discussed above, the 
covenant exists as part of a larger remedy determination and there are 
procedures for changing that determination outside the covenant.131 
 This is a genuine disagreement with the policy of the UECA. The 
UECA determines to live with a protective and potentially complicated 
modification process to encourage parties to enter into covenants.132 
Parties will be hesitant to enter covenants if they do not feel certain that 
their interests will be taken into account in subsequent modifications. 
The UECA’s concern is that fewer covenants will be used, and thus 
their environmental and other benefits will not be achieved. The re-
sponse of these critics is, presumably, that party consent will not be 
necessary to create covenants, so there will be no discouraging effect. 
One concern is with the real world effectiveness of police power-based 
covenants requiring land use and other restrictions when the owner of 
the property and other interested parties have not agreed to them. A 
state can mandate the existence of such restrictions, but without par-
ticipation by the interested parties, there is a real prospect that it will 
not be effectively implemented. 
 Finally, proponents of basing covenants on state police power favor 
allowing administrative enforcement of covenants in addition to judi-
cial enforcement.133 The argument is that administrative enforcement 
is cheaper and more efficient, thus avoiding a drain on agency re-
sources.134 Of course, administrative enforcement could be authorized 
for a covenant created as a state law property interest although the 
UECA does not do so. However, it would presumably have to allow all 
parties—rather than just the agency—to initiate enforcement actions 
and participate in them. This broad allowance could lead to a full blow 
multi-party proceeding that would look much like conventional litiga-
tion and one which is not obviously cheaper or easier than conven-
                                                                                                                      
similar to the issue presented above in formation of a covenant and will not be separately 
discussed here. 
130 See ASTSWMO, supra note 94, at 3. 
131 See discussion supra Part II.C. 
132 See Unif. Envtl. Covenants Act § 10. 
133 See ASTSWMO, supra note 94, at 2; Miller, supra note 94. 
134 This concern about a drain on agency resources is not discussed in the provision to 
require state agency approval of all covenants. 
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tional litigation. The key question appears to be whether parties other 
than the agency can initiate enforcement or participate in it.135 If the 
answer is no, then a substantial justification for restricting other obvi-
ously interested parties is necessary. If the answer is yes, then the effi-
ciencies are far from certain. On this point, the critics’ arguments re-
quire further development. 
 There are two further concerns with covenants based on police 
power. First, some provision must be made for recording them in the 
land records or otherwise integrating them into the property law noti-
fication system. Otherwise, they run a great risk of being forgotten over 
time and overlooked in future land use decisions, ultimately exposing 
the public and the environment to risk from the residual contamina-
tion. While this is conceptually possible, and such integration is accom-
plished with other kinds of land use restrictions, it is a question that 
must be addressed. The second concern is more fundamental. What 
treatment will such regulatory covenants give to existing interests in the 
real property, such as existing mortgages or easements? To simply over-
ride them would present a substantial takings claim. To ignore them 
would run a serious risk of making the covenant ineffective because 
those interests could override its restrictions. This problem must be 
dealt with, and with certainty, to have an effective covenant system.136 
Conclusion 
 The Uniform Environmental Covenants Act (UECA) offers the 
legal infrastructure needed to implement risk-based cleanups of prop-
erty in which some contamination is left in the ground and the risks are 
managed through land use and other arrangements. On examination, 
one sees that a substantial amount of infrastructure is needed to take 
care of the problems of creating the covenant, making it durable, and 
providing for modification and enforcement. Most of the criticism of 
the UECA is for not doing more, rather than for what it does, with the 
exception of the fundamental objection of critics who prefer covenants 
based on state police power rather than state property law. On balance 
the UECA offers a thorough and plausible solution to the problems it 
addresses. 
                                                                                                                      
135 Colorado authorizes suit by the grantor, specifically named third-party beneficiar-
ies, and an affected local government. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 25-15-322(4)–(5) (2001). 
136 The covenant systems based on police power have not addressed this question. See, 
e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. § 25-15-317. 
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 The UECA is important because it provides a mechanism to pro-
tect the public and the environment from a continuing risk. What then 
are the continuing concerns with whether the UECA will in fact do its 
job? At least two are evident. First, will the UECA work out as planned, 
over the long term? Covenants impose restrictions that may be needed 
for a long time, and institutional memory and the existing enforcement 
mechanisms may not be adequate to insure implementation of the re-
strictions over the long term. The UECA has mechanisms, but they are 
only as good as the memories and energies of the humans who must 
implement them. Twenty-five, fifty, or one hundred years or longer is a 
long time for fallible humans and imperfect institutions to remember 
that this land use is restricted for an important reason. Recording of 
the covenant in the land records will help focus attention, but some 
concerns remain. Second, will we have the technical and scientific 
knowledge to accurately determine the level of risk posed by residual 
contamination, both when the covenant is formed and over time? As a 
society, we have been serious about the business of cleaning up con-
taminated property for about twenty-five years, and have learned a 
great deal about what is needed and how to do it. We think we know 
enough, but we will surely continue to learn more; therefore, we must 
remember to revise and incorporate new knowledge. 
